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Introduction
I believe we would all agree that the only reason we
produce health technology assessments (HTAs) is to
inform health policy decisions, and when they fail to
do so they are a waste of time and effort. Nevertheless,
at the present time it seems that HTAs often have little
impact [1–4]. My ﬁrst objective will be to consider
some of the factors that cause HTAs to fail to inﬂuence
policy. My second will be to report on an ongoing
experiment in HTA development that attempts to min-
imize these factors, and has resulted in an extremely
high impact of HTA reports on health policy decisions.
Before I start, I have two caveats. First, my remarks
are not evidence-based. They are reﬂections resulting
from my reading and my personal experience both as
an HTA producer and as a health-care decision-maker.
Second, my experience is mostly Canadian, so some of
my reﬂections may not be completely relevant to other
countries.
Furthermore, the decision-makers I will be referring
to are the meso-level policymakers, the people who
make technology acquisition decisions at the hospital
or regional level. In our Canadian system of universal
health insurance, top-level policy, such as decisions on
what programs will be funded, are taken at govern-
ment level. Increasing the impact of HTAs on such
decisions has been discussed elsewhere [5]. But hospi-
tals or regions mostly take meso-decisions, such as
those on the acquisition and use of new technologies.
These organizations are usually given a capped budget
and expected to conform to the Canada Health Act,
according to which they must to give all “necessary”
treatments to all Canadians, a feat that clearly requires
careful prioritization. Sound prioritization decisions
require well-prepared, objective evidence such as is
found in HTAs. So if HTAs are not inﬂuencing these
decisions it is urgent that we consider what to do
about it. Our options are limited.
I believe the UK solution to this problem is not an
option for us in Canada. In the UK the ﬁnal path of all
HTAs is the National Institute of Clinical Excellence
(NICE), and their policy “recommendations” are now
virtually mandatory, and Regional Authorities are
required to follow them. North America is probably
too big and regional differences too great for such a
solution to be accepted. So we must consider the other
option. We must ask why many HTAs lack impact and
what we can do about it.
Why Some HTAs May Lack Impact
For HTAs to have impact, they must ﬁrst of all be
understood and be acceptable to those who use them.
But decision-makers do not always ﬁnd this easy. They
have problems, both with their content and with their
presentation.
Content Issues
The ﬁrst problem is acceptance of the quality-adjusted
life-year or QALY [6]. This is at ﬁrst surprising. The
concept is immensely attractive. When it is your job in
a hospital or regional authority to have to allocate
resources with a capped budget, in theory it is a won-
derful solution to be able to compare quite different
health outcomes—curing heart disease or headaches—
using a single unit such as the QALY. But many deci-
sion makers do not trust this unit. They have ques-
tions, such as these:
Is it meaningful? It may well be meaningful to health
economists, but the institutional administrators who
have to use them have difﬁculties. Can interventions
that reﬂect the quality of life really be measured in
units of length of life? Can we really estimate the
health beneﬁts of Vioxx or Viagra, which have no
effect on longevity in units of length of life survived?
The following example taken from a study of Smith
and Roberts [7] helps to illustrate their dilemma. This
report concluded that the cost-effectiveness of taking
ﬁve Viagra pills per month compared with no therapy
was $11,230 per QALY. Because this was less than the
cost of a year of life saved by cholesterol lowering
medication, or coronary artery bypass surgery, and in
addition was below the critical threshold of $50,000
per QALY, Viagra should be considered a higher pri-
ority in the allocation of resources than treatment of
these medical conditions.
Now many decision-makers would say any analysis
that arrives at this sort of conclusion needs to be ques-
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tioned. And of course questions are not lacking. They
relate in particular to the measurement of the health
status preference, or utility, which when multiplied by
life expectancy constitutes the QALY. These questions
are not new. They have been extensively debated
before. Yet, QALYs are still used to inform policy deci-
sions as if such questions did not exist, or had been
successfully answered. For example:
Whose utility? One of the oldest questions is whose
health preference (utility), should be measured when
making decisions that involve shared resources? Smith
and Roberts did not actually measure any. They used
the ﬁndings of Volk et al. [8] who, a year or two earlier
had carried out a study of 10 healthy middle-aged
men. These men, when asked through time trade-off
what proportion of their remaining lives in perfect
health they would give up to avoid impotence, came up
with an average response of 0.26. Health professionals
have arrived at lower estimates such as 0.05 [9] and
0.15 [10], while the wives of the 10 men studied by
Volk and colleagues arrived at a value of 0.02 [8]. So
the issue is this. Should we be measuring utility as esti-
mated by the sufferers, by their wives, by average cit-
izens, by taxpayers, or by health professionals? The
answer is, we do not yet know. But until we all adopt
the same approach it is clear that for this reason alone,
this unit, and the QALY derived from it, is an inap-
propriate measure to use as a determinant of serious
health policy decisions.
Which utility? Decision-makers are increasingly
aware that utilities are measured by different tech-
niques such as time trade-off, and standard gamble.
Nevertheless, these techniques do not consistently give
the same results [11]. Which technique should we
believe? Again, we do not know [12]. But clearly for
serious decision making we should not be comparing
QALYs derived by one technique with QALYs derived
by another.
Reliability? Unfortunately, the measurement of utility
is not consistently repeatable; when it is carried out by
different investigators on the same subject, by the same
investigators on different subjects [13], and even by the
same investigators on the same subjects [14]. Decisions
based on an unreliable measurement should surely not
determine serious health policy decisions.
Threshold? It is commonly presumed, as in the Smith
study quoted above, that there is some threshold such
as $20,000, or $30,000, or $50,000 per QALY that
separates acceptable from unacceptable technology
acquisitions. Useful as this would be, there is unfortu-
nately no logical reason to support any particular gen-
eralizable threshold. (Any health authority can of
course arbitrarily decide that “x” is the upper limit of
what they are willing to pay, but their decision has no
validity outside the jurisdiction in which it is made).
The  role  of  QALYs  in  decision-making. The sole
objective of cost utility analysis is to enable compari-
son of the price of achieving different health beneﬁts,
either explicitly in a league table or implicitly, when
trying to establish priorities. If the unit of comparison
varies according to who estimates it, and the way in
which it is estimated, and if it is in addition unreliable,
then it should clearly not be used as the a determining
factor when making policy decisions on the acquisition
or use of health technologies.
Fortunately,  it  turns  out  that  in  the  real  world
of meso-decision-making, cost-effectiveness seldom
determines policy decisions. In practice the ﬁrst and
principal determinant is the estimated health impact of
the technology in question, and the second is the
opportunity cost (what will have to be given up to pay
for it). Nevertheless,  the  opportunity  cost  is  often
difﬁcult  to identify. When an institution spends $1
million on coated stents or implantable cardiac deﬁ-
brillators the money is usually taken off the top of the
institutional budget, and the budgets of all depart-
ments in the institution are squeezed proportionately.
So as a surrogate for opportunity cost, decision makers
use the estimated budget impact of a technology acqui-
sition (expenditure by the institution as a fraction of
institutional budget). 
These two factors, the health impact and the budget
impact are issues of objective scientiﬁc inquiry. By con-
trast the third determinant, desirability, is very differ-
ent. Whether the available resources should be spent
on relief of headaches, hemodialysis, or heart surgery,
is a subjective decision, dependent on political and
social pressures and the opinions and values of the
decision-makers. Accordingly, such decisions are not
generalizable. They are not the same in Beverly Hills or
Bangladesh and because they are locally variable it is
helpful to develop local ways of arriving at these
decisions.
In practice cost-effectiveness provides the decision
makers with a sense of the relative value of the acqui-
sition in question. It tells them whether or not they
have a “good buy.” The knowledge that a technology
that they want and need is available at a low cost in
Determinants of hospital level decisions
1. Health impact: The size of expected health beneﬁt
resulting from expected use.
2. Opportunity costs: What they must do without.
Because hard to identify, we use as a surrogate.
Budget impact: Net Cost/Institutional budget.
3. Desirability: How much it is wanted/needed.
4. Cost-effectiveness: Is it good value for money?
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terms of dollars per QALY might favorably inﬂuence a
decision to purchase, and a bad buy might increase
their hesitation. But except for extremes, cost-
effectiveness really does not determine whether they
should acquire something or not.
Furthermore, in practice decision makers are more
likely to accept technologies with a high cost to effec-
tiveness ratio (up market), when the budget impact is
small (e.g., only two or three uses per year). They feel
they can accept a small extravagance. Nevertheless, the
same technology with the same cost-effectiveness ratio,
and a high utilization rate (say 100 or 500 per year)
would be much less likely to be accepted. But it would
not be the cost-effectiveness that determined the deci-
sion; it would be the budget impact. Indeed, decision
makers seem to subconsciously use a value that corre-
sponds more or less to the product of cost-effectiveness
and budget impact.
Presentation Issues
I would like to turn now, from the content of HTAs to
consider the manner in which they are presented to the
decision maker. Here I would submit that the principal
cause of poor impact of HTAs is their failure to present
results in a user-friendly, timely manner, together with
failure to secure the close collaboration of the intended
user.
User-unfriendliness. The user of an HTA is a busy
individual who is usually neither a statistician nor
health economist. Accordingly, brevity and simplicity
are desirable, and for maximal effect use of
“ISPORese” should be minimized.
Timeliness. It seems obvious that HTAs need to be
available when they are needed. Nevertheless, it often
takes 12–18 months to produce an HTA [4], and most
decisions in real life have to be taken sooner than that.
Thus, it can happen that by the time the administrator
has the relevant HTA in his hands, the decision has
long been taken.
User involvement. In a previous review of the impact
of our own HTAs [5], we came up with one important
lesson. When an HTA was asked for, it had 100%
impact. Nevertheless, if we did not ﬁrst identify the
users and make sure that they really wanted the
answer, the HTA was liable to be totally ignored.
An Experiment Designed to Increase 
HTA Impact
In June 2002 the McGill University Health Center
(MUHC), a complex of ﬁve hospitals associated with
McGill University, launched an experiment in HTA
development. The underlying hypothesis was that the
inﬂuence of HTAs on policy could be improved 1) if
the necessary evidence was prepared within the hospi-
tal; and 2) if a credible, transparent decision-making
process was set up within the institution to develop
policy recommendations. The intervention was to cre-
ate an in-hospital technology assessment unit (TAU).
The outcome of the intervention was to be judged by
the impact of reports on hospital policy. 
Functions
The unit has two distinct and separate functions, to
prepare evidence, and to develop policy:
1. To prepare evidence (an objective scientiﬁc activ-
ity), the unit has a small professional staff com-
mitted to access the relevant literature, HTAs, and
any locally relevant data, and to prepare a synthe-
sis of the relevant information.
2. To develop policy recommendations that reﬂect
local conditions and are consistent with commu-
nity values, the unit has a Policy Committee, rep-
resenting each of the ﬁve hospital communities,
the Nurses, MDs, Allied Health-care Profession-
als, Patients, and Administrators. Importantly, for
each technology discussed, representatives of the
stakeholders most affected by that technology are
also co-opted as full committee members.
Process
The topics studied consist of those technology acqui-
sition and use issues faced by the administration, that
are problems because of doubts concerning their
health  effects,  the  involvement  of  signiﬁcant  costs,
or the presence of unusual ethical or legal issues. The
unit only develops policy recommendations, and the
existing institutional decision-making structure is
unchanged. Nevertheless, because the reasons behind
the recommendations are clearly set out and made
public both within the institution and on the Web, to
not accept such recommendations would require the
Administration to explain its reasons.
Results
Since June 2002 the unit has produced 18 reports,
each requiring a production time of approximately
three months. This short production does not mean
they are less rigorous than they would have been if
An experiment. Local HTA production
Hypothesis. The inﬂuence of HTAs on policy could be
improved by:
1. In-hospital preparation of evidence.
2. In-hospital policy development.
Intervention: An in-hospital Technology Assessment
Unit.
Outcome: Judged by impact on policy.
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they had taken 18 months to prepare, although they
may sometimes be slightly less polished and somewhat
lengthier than they might have been with a longer pro-
duction time. Their rapid throughput is made possible
by their production within the institution that wants
the information, where there is rapid access to the
essential experts, and where there is a sense of urgency
and buy-in.
The principal result is that reports have had a 100%
impact on policy. The institution has accepted all rec-
ommendations. Five reports have recommended free
use of a technology that the institution was considering
rejecting, eight have recommended rejection of tech-
nologies that were under consideration for adoption,
and ﬁve have recommended limited use. 
It is of course not possible to estimate the overall
budget impact of these reports. Very approximately, in
comparison to the projected cost of not adopting the
recommendations of each report, their adoption has
resulted in a possible net annual saving of approxi-
mately $3.1 million per year. An account of this exper-
iment is available elsewhere [15] and all reports are
available on the Web site (http://www.mcgill.ca/tau/).
Lessons
The outcomes of this experiment were consistent with
our previously held prejudices, namely: 1) that the
proximity of producer to user promotes relevance,
understandability, and timeliness of HTAs, with an
overall increase in their impact on policy; and 2) that
the administrators who are responsible for decisions
on the acquisition of technologies, at least at the hos-
pital or regional level, need a mechanism that can
capture the evidence necessary for sound decisions.
Equally, they need a mechanism to develop policy,
what the institution should do in the light of the evi-
dence; that is as far as possible consistent with com-
munity values.
Synthesis
First, I have suggested that there is often a disconnect
between the rigorous and careful collection of evidence
that is part of the HTA process, and the failure of this
process to inﬂuence health policy decisions, and I have
suggested possible reasons for this disconnect. Next, I
have described an experiment in which, through devel-
opment of policy in proximity to the end-user, a high
impact of HTA reports on policy has been achieved.
Lastly, I have stressed that most HTAs consist of two
elements, synthesis of evidence (assessment), and
development of recommendations (policy). Most users
want both. The former, the evidence, is fairly general-
izable and can be produced centrally by a substantial
HTA development agency, far from where it is eventu-
ally to be used. But policy advice, what ought to be
done,  depends  very  much  on  local  conditions  and
the values of local stakeholders, and is not widely
generalizable.
I believe that in the future, the collection and eval-
uation of evidence will continue to be carried out by
large expert agencies. Nevertheless, to achieve a sub-
stantial increase in the impact of HTAs on policy deci-
sions, the second part of the process, policy formation,
should increasingly be carried out within, or close to
where HTAs are to be used.
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